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SUMMARY
The internationalization of  Colombian confl ict with the setting up of  Plan Colombia by Andrés Pastrana, then 
maintained by Álvaro Uribe, increased foreign policy fragmentation and confusion in the conduct of  the country’s 
foreign relations. Three arguments are analyzed: fi rst, Plan Colombia intensifi ed the presidential conduct of  
diplomatic relations and the fragmentation of  foreign relations, and made the role of  the Foreign Ministry weaker 
than before. Second, Plan Colombia made relations with USA more complex and diminished and to some extent 
worsened Colombia’s relations with the European Union and most of  its members. And fi nally, Plan Colombia 
stimulated the international participation of  non-state actors, especially non-government organizations, who started 
to do a parallel diplomacy in Washington and in Brussels. The presidency of  Andrés Pastrana and the fi rst presidency 
of  Álvaro Uribe will be examined within the geographic triangle of  Colombia, the USA and Europe.
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TÍTULO: PLAN COLOMBIA: EXPLORANDO ALGUNOS MITOS Y EFECTOS SOBRE 
POLÍTICA EXTERIOR COLOMBIANA 1998-2006
RESUMEN
La internacionalización del confl icto colombiano y la implementación del Plan Colombia, ambos sucesos instaurados 
por el gobierno del presidente Andrés Pastrana, y posteriormente, seguidos por la administración del presidente 
Álvaro uribe incrementó el problema de la fragmentación de la política exterior y la confusión para conducir las 
relaciones exteriores del país. Tres argumentos son analizados: primero, el Plan Colombia intensifi có la conducta 
presidencialista en las relaciones diplomáticas y la fragmentación de la política exterior, e hizo el rol del Ministerio de 
Relaciones más débil que antes. Segundo, el Plan Colombia hizo más complejas las relaciones con Estados Unidos 
y de alguna manera empeoro las relaciones del país con la Unión Europea y algunos de sus Estados miembros. Y 
fi nalmente, el Plan Colombia estimuló la participación internacional de los actores no estatales, especialmente las 
organizaciones no gubernamentales quienes empezaron a desarrollar una diplomacia paralela en Washington y en 
Bruselas. La presidencia de Andrés Pastrana y el primer mandato del presidente Álvaro Uribe son examinados en el 
marco del triángulo de Colombia, Estados Unidos y Europa. 
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INTRODUCTION
Foreign policies, in general, face the challenge of  adapting themselves to the changes brought by 
the new international circumstance of  interdependence and globalization1. One such change has un-
doubtedly been the appearance of  new sub-regional, national and supranational actors. Many aspects 
have become more confused and complicated: the role of  the nation-states, and who within the state 
is responsible for foreign policy. 
Colombian foreign affairs are not an exception to this.  The role of  the Foreign Ministry has 
been reduced, and its tasks are now shared with other ministries, government agencies and parti-
cular actors: the Ministry of  Commerce and the Ministry of  Defense, and other institutions, actors 
and non-government organizations2. The internationalization of  Colombian confl ict with the setting 
up of  Plan Colombia by Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002), maintained by Álvaro Uribe (2002–2006, 
2006–2010), increased foreign policy fragmentation and confusion in the conduct of  the country’s 
foreign relations. 
Contemporary refl ections on this fi eld have done little to solve these problems.  Academic analyses 
have spoken of  the weaknesses of  Colombian foreign policies, the internationalization of  Colombian 
problems, of  the “negative insertion” of  the country overseas, and of  the projection of  a feeble image 
of  the Colombian government. Some studies have analyzed the effects of  the domestic confl ict, the 
drugs problem and, more recently, problems related to terrorism. Others have begun the study of  
the design of  national foreign policy, the weaknesses in the structure of  the Foreign Ministry, and the 
defects in the formation of  diplomatic representatives. 
Few analyses have focused on the problem of  the coexistence of  a weak and fragmented capacity 
for formulating and executing foreign policy and an international context which involves multiple ac-
tors and particular concerns other than those of  the State.  The guiding question this essay will attend 
is as follows: to what extent have the internationalization of  the confl ict and the development of  Plan 
Colombia affected national foreign policy and increased the problem of  making and carrying through 
a coherent foreign policy? The presidency of  Andrés Pastrana and the fi rst presidency of  Álvaro Uri-
be will be examined within the geographic triangle of  Colombia, the USA and Europe.
The approach to the question will be guided by three hypotheses: the fi rst hypothesis is that the 
development of  Plan Colombia intensifi ed the presidential conduct of  diplomatic relations and the 
fragmentation of  foreign relations, and made the role of  the Foreign Ministry weaker than before. 
It will be shown that the design of  Plan Colombia, fi rst in Colombia and then in Washington, was 
directly and exclusively managed by President Pastrana and his team.  The implementation of  Plan 
Colombia, under Pastrana and Uribe, has subsequently come under the Ministry of  Defense, the In-
ternational Cooperation Agency (ICA), and the Agency for Social Action (Acción Social)3.   
1  “La política exterior ha cambiado en sus conceptos: primero, porque incluye una multiplicidad de temas antes no considerados; 
segundo, porque implica diversidad de instrumentos y no solo los políticos-diplomáticos tradicionales; tercero, porque requiere de 
una aproximación interméstica a la realidad, que no olvide los condicionamientos y oportunidades externas, pero que tampoco haga 
caso omiso de las condiciones de factibilidad y las presiones de la política interna. Tal dinámica lleva a disminuir en algún grado las 
fronteras entre la política exterior, las políticas comparadas y la política internacional propiamente dicha”. CARDONA Diego and 
ARDILA Martha, “Colombia y su mundo externo: dinámicas y tendencias”, in ARDILA Martha and others, Colombia y su política 
exterior en el siglo XXI, Bogotá, Fescol, 2005, p.xvi. 
2  Formally, the director of  Colombian foreign policy is the President and the Foreign Ministry is the executor. The Foreign Ministry 
does the day-to-day work in multilateral and bilateral relations. 
3  “La Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional es la entidad creada por el Gobierno Nacional con el 
fi n de canalizar los recursos nacionales e internacionales para ejecutar todos los programas sociales que dependen de la Presidencia 
de la República y que atienden a poblaciones vulnerables afectadas por la pobreza, el narcotráfi co y la violencia. De esta manera, se 
integran la Red de Solidaridad Social (RSS) y la Agencia Colombiana de Cooperación Internacional (ACCI)”, in web page of
  http://www.acci.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=3&conID=544&pagID=820, viewed on 27 October 2007.
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The second hypothesis is that Plan Colombia was the key to restoring relations with the USA, but 
made these relations more complex, and at the same time diminished and to some extent worsened 
Colombia’s relations with the European Union and most of  its members. To support this hypothesis 
the essay will show that, although relations with the White House, the Department of  State, the De-
partment of  Justice and others government agencies were restored, the importance of  relations with 
other actors increased, as was the case with the Pentagon-Southern Command-, the National Security 
Board (NSB), the Anti-drug Tsar and the Congress. Plan Colombia multiplied relations with nume-
rous agencies and came to be a visible political issue, hence dependent to a degree on Congress and 
on the electoral outcomes of  U.S. politics. 
Finally, the third hypothesis is that Plan Colombia stimulated the international participation of  
non-state actors, especially non-government organizations, particularly the defenders of  human rights, 
whose actions sought to infl uence the conduct of  foreign governments and multilateral organizations 
towards Colombia. Colombia’s foreign relations came to be affected not only by the effects of  frag-
mentation and the unbalanced nature of  relations with Washington, with Brussels and with individual 
European governments, but also by the international action of  these non-governmental agents.
It is diffi cult to fi nd a theoretical framework applicable to this scene. Most theories have not fo-
cused on the analysis of  the foreign affairs of  weaker countries and the relationships between these 
countries and confl ict dynamics4. Neorealist studies focus on the role of  powerful countries and they 
assume that domestic contexts have a limited effect on foreign policies.  Among these theories, it is 
“liberal realism” which best fi ts the present study, for it involves both internal and external aspects 
and it is not sensible to privilege one side over the other, as well as that of  “peripheral realism”, which 
provides a coherent explanation for the majority of  confl icts in the international system in tracing 
their origins, “state making” and “state breaking” and “state failure” problems, and the internal and 
external pressure operating in the Third World which create a fertile fi eld for domestic and interstate 
confl ict between countries.
The neoinstitutionalist approach, on its side, although it takes into account the development of  
domestic rules and structures, does not view them in the context of  confl ict dynamics. The existing 
literature on the foreign policies of  small states, developing countries and middle power countries, 
perhaps the most useful for this study, is also limited in the analysis of  the variable “confl ict”.  To fulfi ll 
that theoretical space, this investigation use different sources as Colombian government documents, 
academic publications, the press, NGO’s publications, direct interviews and those of  Colombian and 
American “think thanks”.
PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY
The development of  Plan Colombia intensifi ed presidential diplomacy, the fragmentation of  Co-
lombian Foreign Affairs, and made the role of  the Foreign Relations Ministry even weaker. In fact, the 
process of  launching Plan Colombia, fi rst in Bogotá and then in Washington, was managed “by the 
administration entirely, without the participation of  the Congress, other political actors, or civil so-
ciety”5. The Plan’s implementation under Pastrana’s government, and its continuation during Uribe’s 
4  “The reason is as follows: since small states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the international system 
will be the most relevant level of  analysis for explaining their foreign-policy choices. Because weak states are typically faced with 
external threats to national survival, foreign policy will refl ect an attentiveness to the constrains of  the international environment 
and foreign-policy goals will be less constrained by the domestic political process. By contrast, domestic politics will necessarily play 
a greater role in an explanation of  great power foreign policy. Generally speaking, great powers are faced with a lower level of  ex-
ternal threat in comparison to small states and thus have more options for action. This increased range of  choice will tend to make 
foreign policy formation more susceptible to domestic political infl uence. Consequently, unit level variables cannot be ignored when 
explaining great power foreign policy”, FENDIUS Elman Miriam, “The Foreign Policies of  Small States: Challenging Neorealism 
in its Own Backyard, in British Journal of  Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2. April 1999, p. 175.
5  GARCÍA Andelfo, “Plan Colombia y ayuda estadounidense”, in RESTREPO Luís and others, El Plan Colombia y la internaciona-
lización del confl icto, Bogotá, IEPRI-Edt. Planeta, 2001, p. 194.
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fi rst mandate was, carried out by the Ministry of  Defense and the International Cooperation Agency, 
which later became Social Action (Acción Social). The Foreign Ministry came to be to a great extent 
also excluded from the management of  the most important elements in the international relations of  
the country during these two presidential terms as the negotiations for the renewal of  “Ley para la 
Erradicación de Drogas y Promoción del Comercio Andino” (ATPA), and the dialogue on the crea-
tion of  Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA), and from 2000 on, the central element in 
Colombia’s relations with the United States6.  
To understand the effects of  Plan Colombia on the fragmentation of  the Colombian foreign po-
licy, here it is analyzed the closed process favored by the Colombian government in elaborating and 
formulating it. 
A comprehensive Plan Marshall/Colombia for peace, development and stability in Colombia.
Plan Colombia7, together with the later process of  formulating in detail the aid for Colombia that 
would receive the backing of  the administration and Congress of  the United States, was an initiative 
of  President Pastrana and his team. In fact, this strategy emerged as an electoral pledge between the 
fi rst round and the run-off  of  the 1998 presidential campaign. It combined a negative diagnosis of  the 
internal situation in Colombia with a positive, though naïve, perspective of  a cooperating world. 
The original idea of  a “Plan Marshall” for Colombia was elaborated into a strategy for peace and 
an instrument for gaining cooperation from the international community, for restoring good relations 
with the U.S. and for diversifying international relations at the same time.
Pastrana had early included making peace as an essential point in his platform. It was necessary to 
provide a fresh concept, combining new and previous strategies, purposes and principles8. Thus, with 
his negative vision of  a country immersed in the deepest political, economic, security, social and drugs 
crisis and his view of  a positive world, more inclined toward cooperation, he and his team conside-
red that the solution was to appeal to the international community for support for a plan for integral 
peace, tackling such causes of  confl ict as poverty, rather than solely confronting insurgent groups in a 
military way.  This did not imply overlooking the need for strengthening the security forces and com-
bating violent groups, which was also priority for his government9. 
Pastrana considered that the idea of  a military solution had failed in the past, and rejected this 
option, asserting that he did not just seek a political negotiation with the guerrillas, but a plan for 
international cooperation, such as Marshall had devised for Europe. It was an ambitious and over-
optimistic proposal, as Colombian conditions were far different from those in Europe at the end of  
World War II. Nonetheless, it was an imaginative move to overcome Colombia’s isolation and to seek 
help to face the country’s multiple crises10. 
Thus, the original idea for the “Plan Marshall” for Colombia was inserted into a more compre-
hensive strategy for peace and development, outlined in his statement one week after he had narrowly 
6  The U.S. support to Colombia was arranged at mids 2000. It had important military support in equipment and training. 
7  A “Plan Marshall” for Colombia was proposed during Pastrana’s electoral campaign and presented to the Clinton government on 3 
August 1998. 
8  “En 1998 prácticamente ningún candidato se apartaba de buscar una negociación con la guerrilla, cuando cuatro años atrás casi 
nadie se planteaba esa posibilidad”, PASTRANA Andrés, La palabra bajo fuego, Bogota, Planeta, 2005. p. 149. 
9  One of  the main worries for that time was the increase of  guerrillas attacks. It was clear that Colombian Armed Forces needed to be 
strengthened in terms of  profesionalization, intelligence and technology. In fact “entre 1994 y 1998, el Ejército se había consolidado, 
como un actor más de la violencia al perder parcialmente su rol protagónico como encargado del monopolio del uso de la fuerza”. 
Andrés DÁVILA and others, “El Ejército Colombiano durante el período Samper: Paradojas de un proceso tendencialmente críti-
co”, en  Revista Colombia Internacional, número 49/50,  in page web of  http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/revistas/colinter/da-
vila.htm, viewed on 8 March 2008.
10  “Los problemas de fondo estaban ahí: la pobreza, el confl icto armado, la debilidad de las relaciones internacionales y el narcotráfi -
co. Todo ello conformaba el núcleo de nuestras difi cultades.”, PASTRANA Andrés and GÓMEZ Camilo, La palabra bajo fuego, 
Bogota, Planeta, 1995, p. 41. 
Plan Colombia: Exploring some myths and effects on Colombian foreign policy 1998-2006 Rocío Pachón
análisis político nº 65, Bogotá, enero-abril, 2009: págs. 127-145
d
o
ss
ie
r:
 c
o
n
fl 
ic
to
 e
n
 C
o
lo
m
b
ia
[131]
lost the fi rst electoral round of  8 March 1998.  Pastrana argued that “[Drug crops are] a social pro-
blem whose solution must be itself  part of  the solution to the armed confl ict. Developed countries 
should help us to implement some sort of  “Marshall Plan” for Colombia, which will allow us to make 
great investments in the social fi eld, to offer our peasants alternatives to illicit crops”11. 
Once Pastrana was elected president, the idea of  a Plan Marshall was included in the “Plan Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo” as Plan Colombia12. The aim was to restore relations with the United States and also 
to improve relations with Europe, Latin American neighbours and the multilateral organizations13.
In this fi rst phase, the integral plan was not discussed outside the president’s close team and the 
delegated writers. The earliest version was written in December 1998 by Rodrigo Guerrero, former 
Mayor of  Cali, who had extensive experience in social projects. It was launched in Puerto Wilches, 
Santander, on 19 December as “un conjunto de proyectos de inversiones estratégicas para la paz, 
que canalizara los esfuerzos compatriotas a favor de quienes viven en las zonas mas afectadas por la 
violencia”14. Guerrero was later replaced by Jaime Ruiz Llano and Mauricio Cardenas, the authors 
of  the formal document presented in 1999 to the international community.
It is no secret that the emphasis of  Plan Colombia was changed from an integral social aid pro-
gramme to an antinarcotics strategy after the summer of  199915. This change was the result of  U.S. 
government concerns. The Colombian side of  the negotiation was managed by the presidential team. 
Plan Colombia’s formulation did not include any representation of  the National Congress or other 
governmental entities, though it did incorporate concerns of  the Ministry of  Defense16. Here it is 
important, however, to understand that few governments involve congressmen in the formulation of  
their foreign policy, and few presidents or heads of  government are content to leave foreign affairs to 
foreign ministers. The particular fault of  Colombia was the weakness of  the Foreign Ministry in so 
many areas of  the conduct of  foreign policy. 
Fragmentation of the Colombian Foreign Policy 
The negotiation of  Plan Colombia and its implementation, introduced yet further division in 
Colombia’s conduct of  its foreign policy. The importance in the development of  the Plan of  many 
other government institutions and the relevance acquired of  non-government actors intensifi ed the 
weaknesses of  the Foreign Ministry. The proliferation of  American agencies now interested in the 
Colombian case was the counterpart of  this17.  
11  PASTRANA Andrés and GÓMEZ Camilo, La Palabra bajo Fuego, Bogotá, Planeta, 2005, pp. 48-51.
12  Andelfo GARCÍA, “Plan Colombia y ayuda estadounidense”, in RESTREPO Luís and others, El Plan Colombia y la internaciona-
lización del confl icto, Bogotá, IEPRI-Edt. Planeta, 2002, p. 200.
13  Although the U.S. had begun to consider how to revise its Colombia policy should Serpa be elected, they naturally preferred Pastra-
na, who represented a complete break with the Samper administration. 
14  PASTRANA Andrés and GÓMEZ Camilo, La palabra bajo el fuego, Bogota, Planeta, 2005, p. 118. 
15 It is important to consider that originally in terms of  security “el Plan Colombia solo consistió en el apoyo y mantenimiento con 
dinero de EU a una brigada antinarcóticos del ejercito en entrenamiento armamento y recursos para movilización. Esa brigada fue 
compuesta de tres batallones, 30 helicópteros pesados y 30 medianos. La policía recibe fi nanciación en su programa anti narcoticos 
que incluye el mantenimiento y operación de helicópteros y el de aviones de fumigación. El impacto en el resto del ejercito, que 
son mas o menos treinta brigadas, o sea cien o mas batallones es limitada o nula”, Online Interview with Rafael Pardo, member of  
Pastrana’s team in 1998, 26 March 2007. 
16 “Si bien es cierto que el Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia mantuvo un bajo perfi l en el proceso de formulación del Plan Colombia, 
su participación no fue menos efectiva al quedar incorporada la aparte substancial de la estrategia antidrogas promovida por las 
Fuerzas Militares, que implicaba un cambio importante al colocar un nuevo hincapié en su propia participación en la lucha antinar-
cóticos”, PASTRANA Andrés and GÓMEZ Camilo, La palabra bajo el fuego, Bogota, Planeta, 2005, pp. 203-204.
17 “En la última década, las relaciones de Estados Unidos con Colombia, habían sido lideradas por el Departamento de Estado, seguido 
por el de Justicia, la DEA, el CSN y la Ofi cina de Política Nacional de Control del Narcotráfi co (ONDCP). Un menor protagonismo 
había tenido otros Departamentos como los de Defensa, Comercio y Tesoro. Sin embargo, esta situación tuvo algunos cambios, 
especialmente (…) por un mayor protagonismo del zar Antidrogas, quien ha asumido crecientemente un papel más político y hasta 
diplomático”. A. GARCÍA, “Plan Colombia y ayuda estadounidense”, in RESTREPO Luís and others, El Plan Colombia y la 
internacionalización del confl icto, p. 220.
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In Colombia, the militar components of  Plan Colombia were coordinated and executed from the 
Presidency, together with “la Alta Conserjería para la Paz, el Ministerio de Defensa, y la Dirección de 
la Policía Nacional”. Social components, on its side, were coordinated and executed from the Peace 
Investment Fund (PIF)18 and later, from 2005 on, from the Presidential Agency for Social Action and 
International Cooperation19.  
The results of  the implementation of  the Plan had to be evaluated internationally.  Therefore the 
Plan’s executors became the new diplomatic agents of  the country.  The presidential diplomacy of  
Andres Pastrana and Álvaro Uribe was accompanied by the Alto Consejero para la Paz, the Minister 
of  Defense, the National Police Director and the Director of  Social Action, the new companions of  
the President during his visits to Washington and Europe.  Other Ministers might also take part, ac-
cording to the agenda. 
The role of  the Ministers of  Foreign Affairs, Guillermo Fernández de Soto under Pastrana and 
Carolina Barco under Uribe, was reduced.   Luis Alberto Moreno, the Colombian Ambassador in 
Washington, was the representative for the management of  Plan Colombia’s affairs in United States. 
His exceptional access to the White House gave him great importance in the relationship between 
Colombia and Washington during the two governments that are being studied here.  
The lack of  coordination in Washington’s policies towards Colombia undoubtedly also had an 
impact on the conduct of  foreign relations in Colombia. 
Southern Command and the Military Group of  the American Embassy in Bogotá, both of  them 
under to the Pentagon, were the agencies that were most strengthened20.  This fact accounts for the 
increased importance of  the Colombian Ministry of  Defense and the Military Forces in their relations 
with the United States. Otto Reich, ex-under secretary for Hemispheric Affairs, and who had been in-
volved with relations with Latin America since Ronald Reagan’s times, did not have a signifi cant role 
in Washington’s policy towards Colombia. Though he was nominated for the Department of  State’s 
highest post in Latin American affairs, he did not obtain approval by Congress.  Ambassador Roger 
Noriega, who had been appointed adjunct Secretary of  State for Western Hemispheric Affairs, in July 
2003, was also remembered as having had little infl uence.  In general, for the Secretary of  State con-
fl icts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, and other “evil axis” actors came to attract Washington’s attention 
more than the situation in Colombia21.
The diversifi cation of  American agents in the management of  Plan Colombia in Washington de-
manded similar diversity on the part of  Colombian offi cials. Not only was the focus of  the relationship 
now fi rmly in Washington; it also had to face the vicissitudes generated by the ever more complicated 
agendas.
PLAN COLOMBIA: BOGOTÁ AND WASHINGTON AND BOGOTÁ AND EUROPE
Plan Colombia brought a more complex relation between Bogotá and Washington and affected 
Colombia’s relations with the European Union and its member states.  Regarding the US it was buil-
ding up a complex framework of  relationships. The U.S. Foreign Policy changed and also the dyna-
18  “Creado por la Ley 487 del 24 de diciembre de 1998 y reorganizado por el Decreto 1813 del 18 de septiembre de 2000 y por el 
Decreto 1003 del 29 de mayo de 2001, como principal instrumento de fi nanciación de programas y proyectos estructurados para la 
obtención de la Paz”. in web page of  Acción Social, http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=3&conID=
544&pagID=825, viewed on 27 October 2007. 
19 “Creada por el Gobierno Nacional con el fi n de canalizar los recursos nacionales e internacionales para ejecutar todos los programas 
sociales que dependen de la Presidencia y que atienden a poblaciones vulnerables afectadas por la pobreza, el narcotráfi co y la 
violencia”. in web page  of  Acción Social, http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=3&conID=544&pag
ID=825, viewed on 27 October 2007. 
20  Personal interview with Bruce Bagley, Quito, 30 October 2007.
21  Personal interview with Bruce Bagley, Quito, 30 October 2007.
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mics of  its relations with Colombia22. The White House, the Department of  State, the Department 
of  Justice, and other government agencies all came to exercise formulation and execution tasks. The 
Pentagon and South Command, the Board of  National Security (BNS), the anti-drugs Czar and the 
Congress become strategic and active actors for the US-Colombia relations.
New relations with traditional US actors
For the White House, the approval of  Plan Colombia was an important matter. As was mentioned 
above, during President Clinton’s government the impulse given to this Plan after the summer 1999 
was considered a strategic and necessary decision. President Bush confi rmed support on the Plan Co-
lombia, and more strategy after the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001.
Now part of  the international war on terrorism, Plan Colombia was seen not only as an instru-
ment to fi ght drugs but also as the way to combat terrorism in Colombia.  President Bush reaffi rmed 
support on anti-drugs fi ght and to Plan Colombia, and he would later recognize the achievements of  
President Alvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy.  In 2004 he announced that he would request 
Congress to renew support for Plan Colombia23.   
Although the Department of  State is a part of  the Executive Branch along with the White House, 
the two tend to perform separately.  The Department of  State is a second actor and must be unders-
tood as “a bureaucracy apart, with closer contact to the Congress, while the White House team serves 
the political needs of  the President”24.
As regards Plan Colombia, this institution was the authority which drew up the list of  foreign te-
rrorist organizations, to which the FARC, ELN and the AUC of  Colombia belong. The Department’s 
reports approved what was being done in Colombia.  This can be confi rmed in their International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2004. Madeleine Albright, Collen Powell and Condo-
leezza Rice were the secretaries of  state concerned.  The Sub-secretary of  State, Thomas Pickering, 
during Albright’s period, played an important role, as well25. 
Madeleine Albright (1997-2002) prioritized relations with Hong Kong, China, Kenya, Tanza-
nia, Iraq, and in 2000 with North Korea, when she paid an offi cial visit to that country. Colombia, 
however, also had some prominence. With Albright and Thomas Pickering, who had been assigned to 
promote Plan Colombia in Bogotá and in the Congress of  the United States, the Department of  State 
became one of  the most important institutions to support Plan Colombia.
Collen Powell was also in favor of  supporting Plan Colombia.  As Secretary of  State at 11 Septem-
ber 2001, he was in Lime and made some pronouncements at that time on FARC and AUC. None-
theless, he had to face criticisms of  Plan Colombia’s effectiveness from some American congressmen 
and he admitted that much more had to be done in order to reduce the high demand for drugs and to 
improve respect for human rights. 
Condoleezza Rice was a faithful defender of  Plan Colombia, during the period analyzed in this es-
say.  Under her, the international priorities for the United States were focused on the Middle East and 
on relations with Russia. In the Western Hemisphere, however, Colombia had an important priority 
status.  Even when Plan Colombia’s fi ve-year term came to an end in 2006, for Rice, the commitment 
to Colombia was not over26.  
22  MITCHELL Christopher, “¿Una espiral descendente? Sobre cómo se elabora la política de los Estados Unidos hacia Colombia”, in 
RESTREPO Luís, Estados Unidos Potencia y prepotencia, Bogotá, TM Editores, 1998, p. 4.
23  Presidency of  Colombian Republic, “Bush brinda total respaldo a Colombia”, November 2004, in web page of   http://noticias.
presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/sne/2004/noviembre/22/06222004.htm, viewed on 27 October 2007.
24  REYNOLDS Paul, “Las batallas de poder en Washington”, in BBC Mundo, Wednesday 17 November 2004, in web page of  http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_4017000/4017965.stm, viewed on 27 October 2007.
25  Telephonic interview with Michael Shifter, Vice President-Policy Inter-American Dialogue, 2 November 2007.
26  RICE Condoleezza, “Aunque el plan Colombia termine, el compromiso de Colombia con EU sigue”, Monday 23 September 2006, Co-
lombian Presidency, in web page of  http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2005/abril/27/14272005.htm, viewed on 27 October 2007.
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The Department of  Justice plays a prominent part in the international strategy of  Washington against 
narcotics, since the Department includes the DEA in its organization. The DEA is in charge of  the co-
ordination of  all repressive efforts against narco-traffi c, and it has numerous agents in Colombia27. The 
strengthening of  the DEA’s action in Colombia can be seen from 2003 onwards: the DEA and the Ministry 
of  Defense committed themselves to make the expropriation of  assets more rigorous and transparent28.
Even Plan Colombia increased the role of  these three American agencies in relations with Colom-
bia, other actors, however, strengthened their role as well.
The increased role of other US agencies
Southern Command became more involved. This was made clear by the presence of  an expanded 
military group in the American Embassy in Colombia, which started to fulfi ll a number of  missions 
and responsibilities. After 11 September 2001 U.S. military aid to Colombia ceased to be restrictive 
to counter-narcotics operations.
Although the Board of  National Security (BNS) re-designed Colombia’s strategy from 2001 on, 
the U.S. also acquired new priorities in the Middle East and against other enemies announced under 
Bush government according to the National Security Strategy of  2002. However, the United States 
let the world see the importance still assigned to Colombia. The document stated that “in the Western 
Hemisphere we have formed fl exible coalitions with countries that share our priorities, particularly 
Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Colombia”29. The two paragraphs which concerned the Western 
Hemisphere were devoted to Colombia and the Andean Community.
The National Security Strategy was the document in which Washington clarifi ed the idea of  de-
veloping an active strategy to help the Andean nations in economic and judicial matters, and, in their 
fi ght against terrorist organizations. It was in this document that the United States recognized the link 
between the war on terrorism and the extremist groups in Colombia. 
The Anti-drug Czar, General Barry McCaffrey, who held offi ce until 2001, took an active and 
sometimes controversial part. John Walters’s performance was, different. For the former, American 
action in the fi ght against drugs should be in Colombia, not in the U.S.  The main goal of  such action 
should be focused on attacking cocaine and poppy crops. His activism in Colombia was on some oc-
casions exaggerated30. 
Walters played a role marked by contradictions and a growing general questioning. “Durante su 
periodo, incluyendo datos ofi ciales e independientes, el área de cultivo de la hoja de coca se expandió 
de tres departamentos a casi todo el territorio colombiano. (…) En abril de 2001, el mismo zar antid-
rogas reconoció que en el último año el cultivo había aumentado en cerca de un 30%”31. 
The importance of  the offi ce, created in 1988, increased with the implementation of  Plan Colom-
bia. The anti-drugs Czar came to be one of  the most important of  the President’s advisers on rela-
tions with Colombia. He “advises the President regarding changes in the organization, management, 
budgeting, and personnel of  Federal Agencies that could affect the Nation’s anti-drug efforts; and 
regarding Federal agency compliance with their obligations under the Strategy”32.
27  MITCHELL Christopher, “¿Una espiral descendente? Sobre cómo se elabora la política de los Estados Unidos hacia Colombia, in 
RESTREPO Luís, Estados Unidos potencia y prepotencia, Bogotá, 1998, p. 27.
28  “La DEA y Colombia se unen contra el tráfi co de drogas”, in Voanews, Wednesday 5 November 2003, in web page of  http://www.
voanews.com/spanish/archive/2003-11/a-2003-11-05-12-1.cfm, viewed on 28 October 2007.
29  The White House, “The National Security Strategy, September 2002”, in web page of  http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/
nss4.html, viewed on 28 October 2007.
30  Personal interview with Bruce Bagley, Quito, 30 October 2007.
31  LIZARZABURU Javier, “EE.UU. reducirá ayuda a Colombia”, in BBC Mundo, Thursday 10 August 2006, in web page of  http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_4778000/4778865.stm, viewed on 28 October 2007.
32  The White House Offi ce of  National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), a component of  the Executive Offi ce of  the President, was 
established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of  1988. See web page of  National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in web page of  http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/about/index.html, viewed on 28 October 2007.
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Finally, among the institutions which increased their degree of  participation in relations with Co-
lombia from 1998, was the Congress of  the United States. Congress’s role in budget appropriations 
gave it great infl uence from the start: fi nancial approval for Plan Colombia depended on Congress. 
Once Thomas Pickering and the Colombian Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno and their respective 
teams had agreed the fi nd version of  Plan Colombia, they sought fi nancial support from Congress, 
not only for one year but for a three-year term.
Plan Colombia and its continuous renewals thus became the subject not only of  debate in Con-
gress, between Republicans and Democrats, but also to the differences between the Legislative and 
Executive.  During the times that the leading party in Congress was not that of  the President, as in 
December 1999 and the following months, Plan Colombia faced diffi culties for its approval.
Later on, with the Republicans controlling Congress and with a Republican President, the leader 
of  the House of  Representative, J. Dennis Hastert, emerged on “a solid leader in the creation of  a 
bipartisan consensus in the Congress of  the United States for the assistance of  that country to Colom-
bia.”33  During this period, the bipartisan consensus was shown with Robert Menéndez’s declaration: 
a renown Democrat and critic of  the Plan, he said that it was necessary to maintain the goals achieved 
in the Andean Regional Initiative, and stressed the opportunity to “permanently interrupt all drug 
dealers’ moves, as well as to improve security, stability, respect for human rights and real opportunities 
for Colombia”34.
The importance in U.S politics of  the drug issue, and its relation with the internal confl ict in 
Colombia, enabled Pastrana to re-establish good relations with Washington. Plan Colombia was ins-
trument and the result. Although this diplomacy worked well with the United States, it unfortunately 
failed to achieve the same success with the European Union and most of  its member states.
In fact, the support given to Plan Colombia in Washington after August 1999 affected the relatio-
nships between Colombia and many European states. First, it produced a negative response on the 
part of  many Europeans, who viewed the Plan as excessively centered on drugs and coca eradica-
tion. Only Spain and England showed some support for it. Secondly, especially after the ending of  
Pastrana’s peace process in February 2002, it appeared to reduce the importance of  Europe’s role in 
Colombia. Their participation in Colombia was reduced to a barely developed and vague policy of  
cooperation.
With European Union a negative view was emphasize so as proposals for alternative strategies
The European Parliament in its statement about Plan Colombia in February 2001 rejected Plan 
Colombia. It takes the view that, in addition to their military dimension, the prevailing situation and 
confl ict in Colombia have a social and political dimension whose roots lie in economic, political, cul-
tural and social exclusion. For that it believes that stepping up military involvement in the fi ght against 
drugs involves the risk of  sparking off  an escalation of  the confl ict in the region, and that military 
solutions cannot bring about lasting peace. Additionally, stresses that “European Union action should 
pursue its own, non-military strategy combining neutrality, transparency, the participation of  civil 
society and undertakings from the parties involved in the negotiations”35.
Several factors account for this negative reaction. From the European perspective, the Plan did 
not emphasize enough peace-making and social justice. Additionally, the Europeans were naturally 
indifferent to the military dimension, despite its obvious importance to the U.S. 
33  Colombian Presidency, “Congreso y Gobierno de EU defi nen éxito del Plan Colombia”, 11 May 2005, in web page of  http://noti-
cias.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/sne/2005/mayo/11/19112005.htm, viewed on 28 October 2007.
34  HERSMAN Rebecca, Friends and Foes: How Congreso and the Presidente really make Foreign Policy, Washington, The Brooking 
Institutions, 2000.
35  European Parliament Resolution on Plan Colombia and the support to peace process in Colombia, Paul-Emile Dupret, European 
Parliament resolution on Plan Colombia and support for the peace process in Colombia, 1 February 2001.
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This decision of  the Parliament affected bilateral relations. They went through a period of  con-
fusion and instability, before this was revoked with some Europeans participation in Pastrana’s peace 
process, and a moderate programme of  assistance.
Despite this cooperation policy, Colombia was hardly important to the EU and the EU was not 
the most important donor to Colombia. West Balkans, Central and East Europe, the Mediterranean 
countries, Middle East, the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c countries were over any Latin American 
countries.
During 2000-2006, the Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 
allocated to Albania amounted to EUR 282.1 million36 and for Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted 
EUR 502.8 million37. EC aid to Colombia amounted up to EUR 105 million. This assistance consis-
ted in Humanitarian aid, Human Rights protection, NGO projects, environmental projects, the fi ght 
against AIDS, specifi c action against land mines, decentralized cooperation, rapid reaction mecha-
nism projects and migration issues38.
United States through USAID was far the largest donors. European Union, taking together the 
Commission’s amount allocated to Colombia and that of  each European country, was the second 
donor39. 
There was much confusion in the statistical data on EU cooperation to Colombia. Planeación Na-
cional, the International Cooperation Agency, the Commission Delegation for Colombia and Ecua-
dor and the individual European country’s agencies for cooperation with Colombia give different 
statistical results.
This confusing scene, give the EU some visibility.  In Colombia and overseas, the Europeans soug-
ht to show their altruistic profi le, demonstrated their actions in this distant country. This was part of  
the EU’s search to fi nd an identity, as a cooperative actor, different from the US.  
Europe: a second rank actor in Colombia once again.
Despite President Pastrana’s stated hopes, Plan Colombia had met with a disappointing  response 
in the EU and most of  its member states.
At fi rst, it was naively thought that Europe might balance US military support and American 
infl uence in Colombia, with an emphasis on development and social aid. Such thought showed, from 
the start, the slight knowledge that the Colombian government had about the European Union. Euro-
pe was then composed of  sixteen members, fi fteen states and a supranational structure, all of  them 
holding different initiatives and interests.
Relations between Colombia and Europe, can also be studied in the light of  two other factors. 
The fi rst of  these was the change applied in the Colombian Foreign Ministry structure in 2000, under 
Guillermo Fernández de Soto40. This lowered the degree of  priority of  certain important regions, and 
this was the case of  Europe.  The second factor was some mistaken decisions made by the Colombian 
government which, whether though ignorance or lack of  interest damaged relations with Europe. 
The changes in the Ministry structure in 2000 lowered the level of  importance given to the rela-
tions between Colombia and Europe. The new structure altered the balance in the foreign ministry 
36  European Commission, “Albania - EU-Albania relations”, in web page of  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/albania/eu_albania_
relations_en.htm, viewed on 8 Mars 2008
37  European Commission, “Relaciones con terceros países”, in web page of  http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/es/s05050.htm, viewed 
on 8 Mars 2008. 
38  European Commisión, “The EU’s relations with Colombia”, in web page of  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/in-
tro/index.htm#4, viewed on 8 Mars 2008.
39  Social Action, “2007 Cooperation map’s statistics”, in page web of  http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/acci/web_acci/nuevomapa/
bienvenida.html, viewed on 3 November 2007.
40  Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, “Decreto Numero 19 de 1992, Decreto Numero1295 de 2000, Decreto Numero 2105 de 
2001”, Bogotá. 
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which in 1992 had placed the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa, Vice-Ministers. A reform re-
structured the Ministry into two main divisions, bilateral and multilateral relations. With the removal 
of  the Vice-Ministry for European affairs and, later on, of  the General Direction for Europe, Europe 
was brought down from second to fourth place in the level of  priorities in Colombia’s foreign poli-
cy41. This situation was worsened by further changes introduced in 2002 under President Uribe. The 
infl uence of  Ministry of  Defense in Colombian foreign affairs was a new factor that had the effect of  
lessening interest in most of  Europe.
Through ignorance about or lack of  interest in Europe, Presidents Pastrana and Uribe clearly 
made some mistakes.  Focused on domestic and security matters, the Uribe government paid no suffi -
cient attention to Europe. 
An outstanding example was the decision made to close for reasons of  economy the Colombian 
embassies in Denmark and Greece during the second half  of  2002.  The Colombian government was 
not aware that Denmark was to be President of  the EU during that term, and that Greece, apart from 
being Denmark’s successor, was the country in charge of  the revision of  the Generalized Preference 
System GPS-drugs, granted to the ACN (Andean Community of  Nations) for their products in the 
European market42.
President Uribe’s fi rst tour of  Europe, in February 2004 was not as successful as it might have 
been. Even though his performance in Brussels can be considered positive – he presented his Demo-
cratic Security Policy and set out its results and the country’s economic recovery – his visit to the Euro-
pean Parliament should have been omitted. Uribe found generous interlocutors in Javier Solana, High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Common Security, as well as in Chris Patten, Commissioner 
for Foreign Affairs.  He also had a bilateral encounter with Gerard Schröeder who approved EUR 14 
million for Colombia for the following two years.  But in his visit to the European Parliament, he met 
with opposition from members of  Social Democrat parties and ONG representatives, who greeted 
him with street demonstrations. 
The general weaknesses of  Colombian diplomacy in Europe came from defects in the formulation 
of  Colombian foreign policy, inadequately staffed embassies, frequent changes of  Ambassador, coun-
tries where Colombia has no representation, ignorance of  the effects of  the expansion the of  number 
of  countries in the European Union and lack of  Colombian representation in those countries, inade-
quate coordination between Colombian ministries and agencies in charge of  relations with Europe, 
lack of  skill in relation with NGOs, weak coordination of  European policy with other Latin American 
nations, weak coordination between Colombian policy towards Europe and towards the US.  The fi rs 
of  weaknesses could be made longer. Colombia is also unaware of  the diplomatic resources of  ene-
mies and rivals, for example of  the resources of  President Hugo Chavez.
COLOMBIA AND NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
In Colombia a vibrant national and international civil society –NGOs and international commu-
nity- was engaged in a search for peace from 1998. It became more prominent with the internationa-
lization of  the confl ict and the implementation of  Plan Colombia. Although, the aim of  most writings 
has been on “evaluating the effects of  the internal armed confl ict on Colombian civil society and the 
consolidation of  democratic institutions, to examine civil society initiatives that could contribute to 
the resolution of  the confl ict, and to explore ways that the international community might support 
41  PACHÓN Rocío, “la gestión y la negociación de Colombia ante la UE frente a un caso de estudio como es el Sistema Generalizado 
de Preferencias / SGP Régimen droga y SGP Plus”, Working Paper, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, No. 15, 2006.
42  “Durante el primer semestre de 2003, la Comisión Europea analizó la nueva cláusula de graduación puesta al SGP-droga y por 
razones de competitividad, empezó a preparar su informe para que Colombia perdiera las preferencias arancelarias concedidas 
al sector cinco de su producción hacia Europa –fl ores, frutas y hortalizas-“. See PACHON Rocío, “La gestión y la negociación de 
Colombia ante la UE frente a un caso de estudio como es el Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias / SGP Régimen droga y SGP 
Plus”, Working Paper, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, No. 15, 2006.
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peace efforts in Colombia”43, what is important here is to understand that the external lobbying by 
NGOs created a parallel diplomacy which affected the image of  the country and of  the government 
internationally, and posed an additional problem for Colombian foreign relations44.
As a middle level developing country, Colombia would have attracted little NGO attention had 
it not been for the intensity confl ict. The Colombian government’s claim for cooperation was the ar-
med confl ict situation. With the request for aid and cooperation the role of  national and international 
NGOs became more signifi cant. Light was shed around the world on the humanitarian crisis and the 
human rights situation in Colombia.
It is a complex task to measure the impact of  NGOs, other civil society actors and in general, 
the international community, particularly their capacity to infl uence other countries’ and agencies’ 
decision-making in their relations with Colombia.  However, this section will study the actions of  the 
human rights NGOs. In fi gure 1 we can see the large number of  actions from civil society and inter-
national community. 
The effects of a parallel diplomacy
Civil society has used multiple methods to express its rejection of  violence and to contribute to 
peace-building. It can be argued that the principal motivation for social mobilization in Colombia in 
the 1990s was the rejection of  violence and support for the search for peace. Nevertheless, with inter-
nationalization of  Colombian confl ict and implementation of  Plan Colombia many of  those focused 
on the defense and protection of  human rights, intensifi ed and made more effi cient their diplomacy 
parallel to that of  the Colombian government. It was few in the Andrés Pastrana’s Government as 
the dynamics of  the process with the guerrillas had a signifi cant impact on the dynamics of  the peace 
organizations at a national level, given that these organizations focused their attention on what was 
happening in the negotiations between the government and the FARC, but huge in the Alvaro Uribe’s 
fi rst mandate, because with the end of  the peace process, those NGOs entered into a period of  crisis 
and fl ux so found in the confl ict’s internationalization and the implementation of  Plan Colombia 
between Bogotá and Washington the fi eld for their functioning abroad.
The parallel diplomacy of  the NGOs during the governments of  Andrés Pastrana and more 
intensifi ed, during of  the Álvaro Uribe affected Colombian foreign relations in three ways.  They 
affected the international image of  Colombia and created confusion as regards the country’s internal 
problems. They undermined the role of  the government overseas, before some of  the United Nations 
organizations, the European Union, some specifi c member states, other international agencies and 
sectors of  American government and society.  Finally, Colombian and international NGOs managed 
to introduce themselves, with recognized rights, into the decision-making process and into the agenda 
of  cooperation established at the European “mesa de donantes”.
Deterioration of the image of Colombia and its government
In general Colombians and non Colombians NGOs’ networking provides the benefi t, of  course, 
of  information sharing and increased access to expertise. There is also the inspirational value from 
knowing that the struggle to protect human rights is not a solitary one. Moreover, those networks and 
alliances provide protection to organizations and individuals struggling in repressive environments. 
However, the parallel diplomacy used by those Colombian and non Colombian human rights NGOs 
to strengthen their instruments of  infl uence in the diplomatic fi eld also affected the international ima-
ge of  the country and created confusion about its internal realities.  
43  Virginia M. Bouvier, “Civil Society under Siege in Colombia”, Special Report 114, 2003.
44  Those NGOs voices and activities also created internal confusion, affected the governmental legitimacy and the civil-militar coope-
ration, and created many unfi nished projects.  
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Most of  their work consisted of  showing the rough, brutal and inhumane side of  the Colombian 
confl ict.  This affected the strategy shared by the two governments – Pastrana’s and Uribe’s – of  
making the internal confl ict an international issue, showing fi rst the progress obtained in the peace 
process and, later, the achievements in the matter of  security and the economic growth.  The inten-
tion of  the two governments was to present Colombia to acknowledge the confl ictive reality but also 
to show government effort at peace-making, achievements in economic growth and improvements 
in security, while the NGOs stressed the negative aspects of  the country, ignoring or criticizing the 
positive side45. 
This positive and negative introduction of  the Colombian confl ict, most positive since governmen-
tal introduction and most negative since NGOs vision, created multiple economic and political costs. 
In the economic and investment fi eld, this dual internationalization generated uncertainties among 
entrepreneurs and foreign investors, who, without a clear understanding of  Colombian reality, indu-
ced in many instances to avoid or postpone investment in the country. In the political fi eld, Colombia 
came to be seen as a country with an everlasting internal confl ict, with an indefensible humanitarian 
situation and widespread poverty, but also as a state incapable of  providing a solution, and one of  the 
main actors responsible for the human rights violations.
Additionally, policy-makers, the academic community and civil society in the United States and in 
Europe had their own confused perception of  Colombia reality, which determined their recommen-
dations and, in certain circumstances led them to apply sanctions. In general, the variety of  sources 
from which resources were to be acquired generated confusion in the international community, since 
the grounds for appeal to different channels, were at times contradictory. Whereas the government’s 
position was to link international cooperation with the argument of  shared responsibility for the 
drug problem and then to the terrorist as a threat to Colombian social development, the position of  
NGOs linked cooperation to social themes46. Bearing in mind the importance of  these civil society 
organizations and of  social themes in Europe, in multilateral organizations and even in the US, this 
last position had a major infl uence.
Undermining the role of the government overseas
Deterioration of  the image of  Colombia and its government was not the unique bad consequen-
ce. The parallel diplomacy between non-governmental and inter-governmental sectors in Colombia, 
Europe and the US, also undermined the role of  the Colombian government overseas.
In the US WOLA, the Washington Offi ce on Latin America, and the US Offi ce on Colombia are 
the two platforms that support Colombian NGOs parallel diplomacy. Both focused their attention on 
the violation of  human rights and blamed the Colombian Government as an actor responsible. For 
WOLA Colombia is still the country with the greatest number of  human rights violations and highest 
number of  politically motivated murders per year in the Western Hemisphere47. For the US Offi ce on 
Colombia the emphasis is on the continuing human rights crisis in Colombia, and it seeks to educate 
US policymakers, the media and the US public about the impact of  US policy on Colombia48. Con-
45  Several explanations can contribute to understand that the NGOs’ behavior, and among these, one is their interest in obtaining 
resources, and that these resources depended greatly on the degree of  sensitiveness aroused in donors. Video projections, photogra-
phic exhibitions, and other more activities in which the effects of  the Colombian confl ict were shown, can be party understood as 
fund-raising.
46  Many scholars consider Uribe’s arguments to the EU a mistake. It was clear that many in the EU considered the military option to 
counter terrorism was not the way. 
47  WOLA, “Colombian programme”, in web page of  http://www.wola.org/?&option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemi
d=&topic=Colombi, viewed on 8 March 2008.
48  US Offi ce on Colombia, “About Colombia”, in web page of  http://www.usoffi ceoncolombia.com/Mission%20and%20Strategic%
20Vision/, viewed on 8 March 2008.
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necting members of  Colombian civil society with US policy makers, and by involving US citizens in 
the policy-making process, this organization not only affected US perception on Colombia’s reality 
but also, the Colombian government’s relations with Washington.
In Europe and in the multilateral the Human Rights Commission of  Geneva (HRCG) and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) were the two scenes where these NGOs played an important 
role. In the Commission of  Human Rights in Geneva, NGOs argued the deterioration of  human 
rights in Colombia49. In the ILO, the “Comisión Colombiana de Juristas” and the “Escuela Nacional 
Sindical” deployed transnational networks to argue the deterioration of  situation of  trade unionists. 
The High Commissioner for Human Rights had opened a permanent offi ce in Colombian from 
1995, and from 1997 the yearly reports of  this Commission stated that the situation in Colombia 
continued to deteriorate. Additionally, from 2003 they increased the intensity of  their survey once of  
the situation of  human rights in Colombia, and made more severe the tone of  their declarations50. 
From 1987, yearly, the Colombian government was called on by the ILO to answer for the recurrent 
violation of  Colombian workers’ fundamental rights, and from 1998 “por no observar las recomen-
daciones del comité de libertad sindical y de la comisión de expertos en aplicación de normas frente a 
la adecuación de la legislación interna a los compromisos adquiridos con la ratifi cación de convenios, 
en especial el 87 y 98, sobre derechos de asociación y negociación colectiva”51. In sum, Colombian 
NGOs work with both organizations, confused European and multilateral perception on Colombia, 
on its government and on Colombian foreign policy.
In general, although, Colombian governments did not plenty fulfi lled stability, security, democracy 
and human rights, “peace organizations have often demonstrated ambivalence towards formal po-
litics, including a distant relationship from political parties, and a critical and confrontational stance 
with regard to state institutions, inherited from the social struggles of  the previous decades”52. In fact, 
many NGOs found their space, arguments and fi nancial support from abroad rejecting the traditional 
practices of  the political system and showing necessity of  emerging new national actors with interna-
tional impact. 
Affecting the Colombian international cooperation management and its decision-making 
foreign process
Confusion and space that Colombian and international NGOs achieved abroad and, particularly 
in Europe, also allowed them to introduce themselves, with recognized rights, into the decision-ma-
king process and into the agenda of  cooperation established at the European “mesa de donantes”. 
In practice, this introduction was good since strategy of  international cooperation become buil-
ding between donors and local civil society. However, that introduction affected the international 
49  This Commission was created in 1946 in the UN. It can take individual demands and to study a country situation if  it was demanded 
either by particulars or non governmental organizations.
50 It resulted of  the Colombian President speech where it said that “las ONG estaban  divididas en tres categorías básicas: (1) las ONG 
teóricos, que él dice respetar pero con los que en gran parte no  concuerda; (2) ‘organizaciones serias de derechos humanos’, con 
las que el está dispuesto a dialogar; y (3) ‘organizaciones politiqueras que están al servicio del terrorismo y que esconden sus ideas 
políticas detrás del discurso de los derechos humanos’. Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2003, Boletín Incidencia y Com-
promiso “Se deterioran las relaciones entre el Presidente Uribe y las ONG colombianas”, in web page of  http://indh.pnud org.co/
articuloImprimir.plx?id=159&t=informePrensa, viewed on 8 November 2007. See also “Declaración conjunta de organizaciones 
no gubernamentales y sectores sociales colombianos con motivo del 54º período de sesiones de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos 
de Naciones Unidas (16 de marzo a 24 de abril de 1998)”in web page of  http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/conjun.
html, viewed on 28 October 2007.
51  RÍOS Noe Navarro, “OIT nombra observador especial en materia de libertad sindical y seguridad de los sindicalistas colombianos”, 
Escuela Nacional Sindical, Bogotá, 2000, in web page of  http://www.oit.org.pe/sindi/general/documentos/inforoit.html, viewed 
on 28 October 2007.
52  FERNÁNDEZ Carlos and others, “Peace mobilization in Colombia 1978-2002”, Conciliation Resources, 2004, in web page of  
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/peace-mobilization.php, viewed on 11 September 2008.
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cooperation management of  the Colombian government in two ways. First, it ceased to be directed 
exclusively by the government and came to be shared by organized civil society. As a result, the de-
velopment of  international cooperation policy emerged with two formal actors, two different formal 
visions and management routes53. Second, all of  those non-governmental and inter-governmental 
sectors in US and European highlighted the big gap between some maximalist requests dealing with 
the comprehensive conceptualization of  peace ranged over many topics and the reduced capacity of  
the Colombian state in meeting them. Colombia being a country in confl ict, victims were supported 
in their right to make themselves heard both within the country and abroad. 
Regarding the fi rst consequence, whereas the government sought dialogue at a national govern-
ment level, the NGOs had direct dialogues with their international counterparts, which in many cases 
was more effective. The revolution in the fi eld of  this new activism has meant the end of  the nation-
state monopoly of  its international affairs and made the “Global Civil Society” a reality54. This added 
further complexity to the international relations of  the country.
NGO activity at “las mesas de donantes” was an example of  this. NGOs managed to move from a 
mere right to participation and discussion to a right of  participation in decisions affecting the formula-
tion, execution and evaluation of  European cooperation policy. While in “la mesa de Madrid” in 2000 
the NGOs only had participation, in “la mesa de Londres” in 2003 they intervened more directly, 
and in “la mesa de Cartagena” in 2005 they virtually shared responsibility with government for the 
new declaration of  the “mesa de donantes”.  In London, they organized a group of  32 Colombian 
organizations, “la Alianza”, supported by European NGOs and with the recognition of  the British 
Foreign and Commonwell Offi ce, and managed formalize a parallel meeting a day before the intergo-
vernmental event. At the end, some paragraphs of  the Offi cial Declaration concerned the position of  
such organizations55. In Cartagena, they together with the group of  24 (G-24) managed to consolidate 
a formal tripartite dialogue between the Government, the International Community and the Civil 
Society, and to formalize their status as actors in the discussions with the Colombian government. “La 
Alianza” came to be a new policy maker in the international cooperation affairs. 
Regarding the second consequence, US, European and multilateral social visions in Colombia 
increased civil expectations and made perceptions of  the Colombian state weaker than before. Within 
Colombia and abroad discussion began about the Colombia state: a collapsed state, a failed state, a 
shadow state or a weak state.56 The Journal Foreign Policy in its number May-June 2006, published 
for a second time the “failed states list” in which Colombia took the 27th place among 148 states ana-
lyzed.  The government lost legitimacy in the eyes of  a growing number of  foreign readers57.
Management of  international cooperation was disorganized and full of  attacks, counter-attacks 
and improvisation. It confused Colombia’s image abroad, and deteriorated external governmental 
legitimacy. That situation was made more problematic by the weakness of  the Colombian Foreign 
Ministry. In sum, it can be said that the parallel diplomacy between non-governmental and inter-
governmental sectors in Colombia, Europe and the US, created, over the studied period, a panorama 
53  Ibid. “It is important not to forget that there are tensions and differences amongst NGOs perspectives, not only because of  different 
concepts of  peace (peace as the military defeat of  the enemy, peace as demobilization, peace implying greater democracy, and peace 
as social justice), but also because some topics generate serious debate and controversy: the legitimacy of  the armed struggle, the 
parameters of  negotiations, and the issue of  security”.
54  IGNATIEFF Michael, Los derechos humanos como política e idolatría, España, Paidos, 2003, p. 35.
55  “Otros dos párrafos se refi rieron al tema de la cooperación y catorce más a las distintas acciones que tenía que tomar el gobierno 
colombiano, entre ellas una lista de condiciones referentes a derechos humanos, paramilitarismo y al cumplimiento de las recomen-
daciones de la ofi cina del Alto Comisionado”. Personal Interview with Antonio Madariaga, Director of  Viva la Ciudadanía, Bogotá, 
23 October 2007.
56  PIZARRO Eduardo and BEJARANO Ana, “Beyond Armed Actors: A Look at Civil Society”, Harvard University’s Magazine, 
Spring 2003, in web page of  http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/revista/articles/view_spanish/235, viewed on 8 Mars 2008.
57  PIZARRO Eduardo and BEJARANO Ana, “Beyond Armed Actors: A Look at Civil Society”.
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of  relationships more political and economical than altruist. After the end of  the peace process, most 
NGOs needed to strengthen their instruments of  infl uence and used the diplomatic fi eld in order to 
make a genuine impact among the international actors involved in the peace dynamics in Colombia.
CONCLUSIONS
The internationalization of  the Colombian confl ict and the execution of  Plan Colombia changed 
the parameters and the conduct of  Colombia’s foreign relations. As was exposed in the previous three 
chapters, Plan Colombia intensifi ed presidential diplomacy, increased the fragmentation of  Colom-
bian foreign policy-making and weakened the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. It made 
relations with the United States more complex, and placed more diffi culties in the way of, and to some 
extend, weakened relations with the European Union and most of  its members.  Finally, as was shown 
in the third section, the Plan also stimulated the participation of  non-government actors, principally 
the human rights NGO’s, both nationally and internationally.
Despite some negative effects, Plan Colombia was a rational strategy which, undoubtedly, had 
as one of  its main goals the strengthening of  military aid and its military resources.  Although for 
President Pastrana this Plan was subordinated to his peace policy, for Uribe it was to be the means 
to recover the national territory, weaken insurgent groups and achieve a monopoly of  military force. 
The continuity of  Plan Colombia during the two administrations shows that Uribe’s policy was in 
important respects the continuation of  that of  Pastrana. To be more precise, it should be suffi cient to 
notice that many of  Pastrana’s military team survived into Uribe’s administration and that a good part 
of  Uribe’s civilian team had also served under Pastrana. Examples are Juan Manuel Santos, Marta 
Lucía Ramírez, Fernando Araujo, Mauricio González,  Fabio Valencia Cosio, Luis Guillermo Giral-
do, Alfonso López Caballero and Guillermo Fernández de Soto.
Plan Colombia achieved rapprochement with the US and a very substantial increasing US assis-
tance, which the Colombian government undoubtedly needed. That this has to be recognized, but at 
the same time to achieve this end with the maximum of  effi cacy and the minimum of  friction, Co-
lombia should have paid attention to restructuring the management of  the country’s foreign relations, 
that is, more effi cient Ministry, more coordination between ministries and less presidential action. 
The country needs a strategic plan that has a better chance of  not alienating the Europe. This means, 
reorganizing the Foreign Ministry and giving more priority to Europe; more, not less, expenditure 
on foreign relations, not closing embassies for reasons of  economy; more capacity to anticipate Eu-
ropean reactions, again, more professionalism in foreign relations, better service to Embassies, more 
professional Ambassadors and more professional press agencies, and an urgent strategy for opinion 
forming. NGOs exist, and have to be taken into consideration and this implies a proper strategy. The 
government needs to be more aware of  the difference between what goes down well in Colombia and 
what goes down well abroad. It means coordinating Colombia’s relations with Europe and with Latin 
America, as Colombia also has neglected the good management of  relations with neighbors, whose 
are also interlocutors with the European Union 
Certainly, Plan Colombia gained the country essential U.S. support, and has had a high degree of  
success in the fi eld of  security. But its implementation, also reveled great weaknesses in the country’s 
management of  its foreign relations. In general, that weakness has been revealed as the internal secu-
rity situation has improved and it surely must now be addressed.  
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Figure 1
United Nations Organization of American 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights fi eld offi ce 
in Colombia and its reports from 1997. UN Drug 
Control Programme fi eld offi ce in Colombia and its 
reports from 1999.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
its Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia 
1999, 1993 and the Summit of the Americas declaration 
in support of the peace process in Colombia, April 22, 
2001.
Other governments and international 
non-governmental organizations
Civil Society Peace Initiatives
“Declaración de Londres,” London donor governments’ 
meeting, July 10, 2003; Government of Canada and its 
“Confl ict, Human Rights And Democracy In Colombia: 
A Canadian Agenda”, May 2002; European Union and 
its “European Union statement on peace process”, 
December 7 2001; its Europarliament statement on 
“Europarlamentarios advierten al presidente Pastrana 
sobre las responsabilidades en la masacre de Naya”, 
May 6, 2001, its European Union “press release” 
announcing aid for peace process, April 30, 2001; and 
its “la Tercera Reunión del Grupo de Apoyo”, Brussels, 
April 30, 2001; the “International NGO Declaration” in 
advance of the Group of Friendly Nations 3rd Meeting 
on the Peace Process, Brussels, April 30, 2001.
Agreements as “Puerta del Cielo Agreement”, 1998 
(in cooperation with the ELN) and “Nudo de Paramillo 
Agreement”, 1998 (in cooperation with paramilitary 
groups); Joint statements as “Statement from Colom-
bian non-governmental peace organizations on end 
of FARC peace talks”, February 21, 2002; “Aportes 
ciudadanos a la Mesa de Negociación Gobierno – Farc-
Ep”, organizaciones de paz colombianos, November 
16, 2001 and “Letter to President Andrés Pastrana from 
Colombian peace organizations”, November 21, 2001. 
Among others contributions were Asamblea Permanente 
de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz; Colombia en Paz, 
Consultoria de Derechos Humanos y Desplazamiento 
(CODHES); Instituto de Estudios por la Democracia, la Paz 
y la Convivencia en Colombia (DEPAZ); Fundación Ideas 
para la Paz; Fundación Instituto para la Construcción 
de la Paz (Ficonpaz); Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, la 
Vida y la Libertad; Movimiento No Más; Programa de 
Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio; Pastoral Social 
Colombia; Peace on the Table; REDEPAZ; Vía Alterna 
and Viva la Ciudadanía.
United States Government
“Government offi cials’ statements”, “Statements from 
members of Congress” and “U.S. government fact 
sheets and reports”
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